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THE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO ENJOIN
PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURTS
TELFORD TAYLOR AND EVERETT I. WLLISt
WERE constitutional and statutory provisions the sole determinants
of the rules which govern the functioning of our dual system of
courts, an inquiry into the power of federal courts to enjoin pro-
ceedings in state courts would be highly academic, for the provisions
of the written law are clear. Since 1793 there has existed a federal
statute expressly denying to the federal courts the power to enjoin
state proceedings. The terms of the original statute were unquali-
fied 1 and this blanket prohibition continues as Section 265 of the
Judicial Code,2 with but few legislative exceptions. Only in in-
stances arising under laws relating to proceedings in bankruptcy,3
the Federal Insurance Interpleader Act,4 and the Act to Limit the
Liability of Shipowners 5 has Congress relaxed this prohibition to
permit the use of the federal injunctive power.
-Former editors of the Harvard Law Review. The writers wish to aclmowl-
edge the helpful advice of Professor Felix Frankfurter.
1. 1. . .nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in
any court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 STAT. 334 (1793).
2. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1926).
3. This exception is embodied directly in § 265 of the Judicial Code. 36
STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1926).
4. 44 STAT. 416 (1926), 28 U. S. C. Surp. VI § 41 (26) (1932). This
,exception appears as an amendment of the original Interpleader Act which is
found in 39 STAT. 929 (1917), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) (1926). It was enforced
in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. A. S. Reed & Co., 16 F. (2d) 502 (E. D. Pa. 1926),
where the right asserted by claimant had accrued before the amendment.
See also National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930).
5. 9 STAT. 636 (1851), 46 U. S. C. § 185 (1926). This exception has been
spelled out of the statute by judicial construction. The Anmsterdam, 23 Fed.
112 (S. D. N. Y. 1885); In re Whitelaw, 71 Fed. 733 (N. D. Cal. 1896); Petition
of Wheeler, 51 F. (2d) 374 (E. D. N. Y. 1931); see Providence & New York
Steamship Co. v. Hill Manufacturing Co., 109 U. S. 578, 600 (1883). This
construction of the statute is also recognized in Rule 51 of the Admiralty Rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court, expressly authorizing the federal courts
to issue injunctions against any and all suits upon the application of the
shipowner. 28 U. S. C. § 923 (1926).
The liberal construction accorded to the Limited Liability Act has, in in-
stances of ambiguous legislation, been denied. For instance, even before the
1926 amendment to the Interpleader Act, it was palpably inconsistent with
the purpose of that Act that the federal court in which the interpleader
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The historical explanation for the inclusion of the anti-injunction
provision in the Act of 1793 is a matter of some uncertainty. The
purpose of that Act as a whole was narrow and highly practical.
In 1792, Chief Justice Jay and his associates had indicated to
President Washington the hardships incident to eighteenth century
circuit riding.6 The President's message at the opening of Congress
in November, 1792, urged the necessity of revising the first Judi-
ciary Act,7 and the representations of the Justices were laid before
Congress." Although there are no reported debates 9 on the bill
which resulted, it seems clear from the sequence of events that the
letter of the Justices was its immediate stimulus.'0 The general
scope of the bill as enacted 11 confirms the conclusion that it was
not so much designed to correct or forestall abuses of federal juris-
diction as simply to alleviate in some measure the burdensome duties
which had been imposed upon the judiciary by the Act of 1789,
and to fill certain procedural lacunae of that Act.
proceeding was brought should have no power to protect the stakeholder by
injunctions against pending state court actions as well as those in other federal
courts. It was held, however, that there was no implied repeal pro fanto of
the injunction statute. Lowther v. New York Life Insurance Co., 278 Fed.
405 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922). See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 YALm
L. J. 685, 725; (1923) 2 TENN. L. REV. 102. Another indication that tho courts,
though quick to carve out judge-made exceptions to the injunction statute, aro
not disposed to allow it to be affected by other legislation unless the intention
to modify is stated in clear terms, is found in the case of Aultman & Taylor
v. Brumfield, 102 Fed. 7 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1900), in which it was held that
the power of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings was in no way
increased by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U. S. C. §
43 (1926). See also Hemsley v. Meyers, 45 Fed. 283 (C. C. D. Kan. 1891).
But see Tuchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548, 558 (C. C. D. Kan. 1890).
6. AmERICAN STATE PAPERS (1834) 1 Misc. 51.
7. See 3 ANN. CONG. 607 (1792).
8. See id. at 611, 671.
9. It is apparent from the Annals, however, that there was considerable
debate which is not reported. Id. at 875, 882, 654.
10. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPRE51E1 COURT
(1928) 22, n. 60. The suggestion is there made that the fact that the House
Committee to which the letter of the Justices was referred was discharged
from further consideration of the question immediately upon the report of
the Senate bill to the House is convincing evidence that the Act of 1793 was in
direct response to the Justices' representations. But see 1 WARREN, Tim
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926) 89.
11. The various sections of the Act dealt with the number of justices nec-
essary at circuit court sittings; the procedure to be followed in case of
disagreement between the justice and the district judge at a circuit hearing;
the holding of special criminal sessions; the giving of bail in criminal cases;
the issuance of subpoenas; court rules for the return of writs; and tho ap-
praisal of goods taken on execution.
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It has been suggested that the prohibition of federal injunctions
against state proceedings was included in the Act of 1793 as a
result of the opposition, intensified at this time by Chisholn v.
Georgia,12 to extending the scope of federal jurisdiction at the ex-
pense of the states. 13 But, aside from the failure of the terms or
legislative history of the statute as a whole to reflect the current
political issues thus urged to have been responsible for the presence
of the injunction provision, the fact that a prohibition of similar
import had been suggested by Attorney General Edmund Randolph
in 1790 14 indicates that strictly contemporary factors were not the
fundamental reason for the enactment of this clause. It is possible,
however, that the inclusion of the injunction provisions was the
result in part of then prevailing prejudices against equity juris-
diction. This explanation is suggested by the fact that Oliver Ells-
worth was an important member of the Senate committee which
reported out the bill that became the Act of 1793.13 Although in
no way caught up in the popular current of opposition to broad
federal jurisdiction,16 Ellsworth had a pronounced dislike for
chancery practice -, and indeed at one time joined forces with anti-
federalists in urging an amendment to the first Judiciary Act of
1789 which would have required that the facts in federal equity
suits be found by a jury."'
12. 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793). This case held that a state might be sued in
the federal courts by a citizen of another state. The result was the immediate
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. See Donahue, Lmits
of State and Federal Jurisdiction (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 479; Warren, Fcdcral
and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAnv. L. REv. 345, 348, n. 14.
13. See Warren, supra note 12, at 347. See also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast
Line Rr. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 292 (1906).
14. ". . . and no injunction in equity shall be granted by a District Court
to a judgment at law of a State Court." AFmICAN STATE PrEns (184) 1
Misc. No. 17, p. 26. This suggestion was made in a report on the advizability
of amending the first Judiciary Act, 1 STAT. 73 (1789). It has bcen said that
Randolph's recommendation was the direct cause of the inclusion of the In-
junction clause in the Act of 1793. See Warren, loc. cit. supra note 13. But
this seems scarcely probable, as Randolph's proposed amendment was of much
more limited scope than that eventually adopted, inasmuch as it operated only
upon the district courts, applied only to jutdgments at lew of the state courts,
and was merely procedural in purpose. See AMERICAN STATE PAr :s (1834)
1 Misc. No. 17, p. 34, n. S.
15. See 3 ANN. CONG. 616, 675 (1792).
16. See BROWN, LirE oF OLIVER ELLswoRTH (1905) 209.
17. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 194; MACLAY, JOUnNAL OF THE
SENATE (1890) 103.
18. See MAcLAY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 103, 105, 107; Warren, Yciv Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 17S9 (1923) 37 HARMv. L. Rsv.
49, 99.
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But whatever the explanation for the enactment of this statutory
prohibition against federal enjoinment of state proceedings, it may
now fairly be said that it is a "thing of threads and patches" and
that its vitality as an effective force in actual judicial adminis-
tration has become seriously impaired. The Supreme Court hag
flatly declared 19 that Section 265 is not a limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, but is merely a restriction upon
the exercisb of their power to grant equitable relief.20 This con-
stitutes an open avowal that even though the sole object of a federal
suit is to enjoin proceedings in a state court, the federal court must
nevertheless inquire into the merits of the controversy and deter-
mine whether or not the relief should be granted. In the follow-
ing pages an endeavor has been made to classify and analyze the
various situations in which such federal interference hag been
permitted.21
Removal Cases
The first indication of a departure from the categorical terms
of the injunction statute arose out of the statutes allowing removal
to the federal courts of cases begun in state courts.22  Under the
early Removal Acts, what action might be taken by a federal court
19. Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274 (1924). Accord: Sovereign Camp Wood-
men of the World v. O'Niell, 266 U. S. 292 (1924); see Russell v. Detrick,
23 F. (2d) 175, 178 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
20. That the decision would have been otherwise were it not for the excep-
tions which the courts have carved out of the statute is indicated by a flatly
contrary dictum in Ex pcarte Schwab, 98 U. S. 240, 242 (1878), to the eflect
that where the sole purpose of the federal suit is to enjoin state proceedings,
the question goes to the jurisdiction of the federal court over the cause.
21. Very few cases involving the injunction statute arose prior to the
broadening of federal jurisdiction in 1875. Early cases refusing injunctions
against state proceedings are Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch 179 (U. S, 1807);
Peck v. Jeness, 7 How. 612 (U. S. 1849); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (U. S.
1871); cf. Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263 (U. S. 1856).
State courts have seldom attempted to enjoin federal court proceedings,
and no cases have been found upholding such an injunction. Cf. McKim v.
Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279 (U. S. 1812); Weber v. Lee County, 6 Wall. 210 (U. S.
1867); United States v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514 (U. S. 1867); The Supervisors
v. Durant, 9 Wall. 415 (U. S. 1869); Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432
(1897); Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1893); United States v. King, 74
Fed. 493 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1896); Central National Bank v. Hazard, 49 Fed.
293 (C. C. N. D. 1892); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. v. Schendel, 292
Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Ke-Sun Oil Co. v. Hamilton, 61 F. (2d) 215, 217
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
22. The original provision for the removal of cases to the federal courts
was embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 12, 1 STAT. 73, 79 (1789).
The various Removal Acts are listed in Warren, supra note 12, at 369.
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where a state court erroneously refused to permit removal was
never definitely settled.2 But, with the vast extensions of the right
to removal granted under the impetus of the excitement over State
rights and nullification during the Civil War period, it was in-
evitable that the question would ultimately arise. Freach v. Ha, "
decided in 1874, was the earliest case holding that exceptions to
the ostensibly absolute prohibition of the injunction statute might
be made. In that case, the defendant in a state court of Virginia
who had removed the suit, after judgment, to the federal court,
sought to enjoin further proceedings on the judgment by the plain-
tiff in a state court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court held that
the federal court had prior and exclusive jurisdiction of the case
and that Section 265 did not prohibit an injunction ancillary to
the federal proceedings for the purpose of protecting that court's
jurisdiction.25
Since the injunction in the French case was issued after judgment
in the state court to restrain" further proceedings thereon, there
have been occasional suggestions in later cases that the term "pro-
ceedings" in the statute refers only to proceedings prior to judg-
went, and that therefore the statute does not prohibit injunctions
against action subsequent to judgment .2  But that the French case
did not rest on such a narrow basis, the Supreme Court made
abundantly clear in Madisoville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min-
ing Co.,27 where the issuance of an injunction against proceedings
prior to judgment was also held proper.2 And it is now established
23. Cf. Warren, supra note 12, at 370. Mr. Warren appears to take the
position that the Removal Acts prior to 1863 did not authorize a federal court
in which a petition for removal had been filed to proceed with the case until
the state court had authorized the removal. But see Gordon v. Longest, 16
Pet. 97, 104 (U. S. 1842); Railroad v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 14 (1881). All
of the Removal Acts from 1789 on seem to make the removability independent
of any action by the state court. See Fisk v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., Fed. Cas.
No. 4,827, at 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1869).
24. 22 Wall. 250 (U. S. 1874).
25. Accord: Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494 (1880).
26. See Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115, 124 (1914). In Essenay
Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 (1922), which refused an injunction
against proceedings still pending in a state court, Justice Pitney distinguished
the Simon case on the ground that there the injunction issued against execution
after judgment. See id. at 360. But see Central Vermont Ry. v. Redmond,
189 Fed. 683, 688 (C. C. D. Vt. 1919).
27. 196 U. S. 239 (1905).
28. Accord: Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ford, 35 Fed. 170 (C. C. D. W.
Va. 1888); Abeel v. Culbertson, 56 Fed. 329 (C. C. E. D. Tex. 1893);
Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. 11
(C. C. A. 5th, 1916); Hunt v. Pierce, 284 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
Colleton Mercantile & Manufacturing Co. v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 280
117.31933]
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that, where a suit has been properly 29 removed into a federal court,
that court may issue an injunction ancillary 3 to the main pro-
ceedings to prevent any further action in the state court.31
The justification which the cases offer for making such an
exception is that in issuing the injunction, the federal court is
merely acting to protect its own jurisdiction.3 2 But the ground for
federal jurisdiction usually invoked in these cases is diversity of
citizenship, and it is now well settled that over such cases the federal
courts do not have exclusive, but only concurrent, jurisdiction. In
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,33 the Supreme Court held that a
federal court could not "protect its jurisdiction" over a contract
action originally instituted in the federal court, on the ground of
diversity of citizenship, by enjoining proceedings in a suit subse-
quently commenced by the defendant in a state court on the same
Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922); Queensboro National Bank v. Kelly, 15 F. (2d)
395 (E. D. N. Y. 1926); Dillinger v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co.,
19 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), But cf. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Scott, 13 Fed. 793 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1882).
29. The federal court has no jurisdiction to proceed, and hence cannot
enjoin a state court, until a certified copy of the record has been filed in the
federal court. Railroad v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 (1881); see Coeur d'alene Ry.
& Nay. Co. v. Spalding, 93 Fed. 280 (C. C. A. 9th, 1889). Of course, if the
case has been remanded to the state court as not properly removable, ancillary
jurisdiction to enjoin disappears. Southern Pacific Co. v. Waite, 279 Fed. 171
(S. D. Cal. 1922); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Smith, 47 F.
(2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
30. To be distinguished from the problem here under consideration is that
which arises when a suit is brought in a court of a state the sole object of
which is to enjoin proceedings in another state court, and one of the parties
seeks to remove to a federal court. In such a case, if the state court has
already granted a temporary injunction, Section 265 does not prevent removal,
and the injunction remains in full force until dissolved or made permanent by
the federal court. Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281 (1880); Smith v.
Schwed, 6 Fed. 455 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1881). But if the state court has not yet
granted any restraining order, Section 265 prevents removal. Lawrence v.
Morgan's Railroad and Steamship Co., 121 U. S. 634 (1886).
31. See 2 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) § 1099; 2 FOSTER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1920) §§ 270, 270a; Note (1922) 36 HAnv. L. REV. 461.
32. See Hunt v. Pierce, supra note 28, at 325; Dillinger v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co., supra note 28, at 198; French v. Hay, 22 Wall.
250, 251 (U. S. 1874). A federal court will not, however, issue an injunction
to protect the jurisdiction of another federal court. Sand Springs Home &
Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 16 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (relitigation
in state court of matters already adjudicated in a defunct federal court).
33. 260 U. S. 226 (1922). Accord: Young v. Standard Oil Co., 35 F. (2d)
551 (N. D. Cal. 1929). Contra: Garner v. Second National Bank, 67 Vied.
833 (C. C. A. 1st, 1895); Higgins v. California Prune & Apricot Growers, 282
Fed. 550 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922). An attempt is made to distinguish the latter
from the Kline case in Note (1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 153, at 156, n. 15.
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contract. The Court reasoned that, since the Constitution does not
give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving diversity
of citizenship,3 4 but merely capacity to receive such jurisdiction
from Congress, the plaintiff had no constitutional right to a federal
adjudication of his cause of action, but only a statutory right to
proceed in the federal court which was no greater than the defend-
ant's right to proceed in the state court. Even the possibility that
a judgment in the state court would be res jz'dicata of the suit
pending in the federal court was held to provide no basis for an
exception to Section 265.
The exception developed since the Frenck case cannot, therefore,
rest upon an authority generally to protect federal jurisdiction over
a controversy brought to the federal court. But it may be said
that while there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a party
to a suit in a federal court from instituting an action in a state
court on the same cause, yet the Removal Acts provide that when
a suit in a state court has been removed to the federal court, "It
shall then be the duty of the state court to . . . procced gio further
in said suit." 35 This phraseology is strikingly reminiscent of the
clause in the Shipowners' Limited Liability Act,20 which enacts
that from and after the transfer to a trustee of the shipowner's
interest in the ship and freight all claims against the owner shall
cease. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the soundness of
the construction placed upon this Act, that it authorizes a writ of
injunction to issue from the federal courts, is a matter upon which
opinions may differ.37  But assuming that such an interpretation
is justified, no reason is perceived why the similar clause in the
Removal Acts should not be given a like construction. If the courts
in the removal cases had availed themselves of this statutory com-
mand as a ground of decision, they could have avoided the intro-
duction of such unfortunately broad phrases as "protecting the
prior jurisdiction of the federal court."
34. The same would, of course, be true whatever the basis of federal juris-
diction.
35. 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1926).
36. 9 STAT. 636 (1851), 46 U. S. C. § 185 (1926). See note 5, mepre.
37. A prohibition against continuance- of the action in the state court is
certainly not necessarily a repeal pro tanto of the prohibition against issuance
of injunctions to prevent such continuance. It may be plausibly argued that,
had Congress intended the Removal Acts or the Limited Liability Act to
authorize injunctions forbidden by the Act of 1793, it would have EO provided
in the Revised Statutes of 1874, as it did with respect to "any law relating




Out of the same theory of protecting federal jurisdiction has
sprung another judge-made exception to Section 265. While no
basis was found for limiting the application of the Section in early
cases involving the relitigation in a state court of issues adjudicated
in a prior federal action,88 the federal courts have now adopted a
contrary position. In 1906 30 the Circuit Court for the District
of Montana issued an injunction against a state action to enjoin
the plaintiff from asserting any claim to property the title to which
the federal court had previously adjudged to be in the plaintiff. "0
The injunction was found necessary in order to make effectual the
judgment of the federal court in the previous action at law. This
doctrine the Supreme Court later stamped with approval, by im-
plication if not expressly,41 in Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble.4 -
A federal court had rendered a decree defining the rights of a class
of members of a fraternal benefit association. It was held that
the court had ancillary jurisdiction of a bill brought to enjoin
certain members of the class from reopening in the state courts
the questions thus settled by suits against the association, and
that it might properly issue the injunction.43
The same doubts which the principles underlying the Kline case
throw upon the validity of the removal exception, render difficult
a logical justification of the cases now under consideration. More-
over, the federal jurisdiction may be sufficiently protected by the
availability of review in the Supreme Court. If the state court
fails to give to the federal court's judgment the effect to which it
38. Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340 (1877).
39. In the same year, the Supreme Court in Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line
Rr. Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906), rendered a decision which seems properly to fall
in the "relitigation" category, but the decision was placed on the ground that
the state had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the federal court by
the attorney-general's appearance, and that the Act of 1793 only prevented
federal courts from acting against the will and consent of a state.
40. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 148 Fed. 450
(C. C. D. Mont. 1906). Accord: Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jones, 170 Fed.
124 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1909).
41. The Court made no reference to either Dial v. Reynolds or Section 265
of the Judicial Code. It cited Looney v. East Texas Ry. Co., 247 U. S. 214
(1918), which is generally taken as authority for wholly different propositions.
See infra, pp. 1191 and note 106.
42. 255 U. S. 356 (1920).
43. Accord: Wilson v. Alexander, 276 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921);
United States v. Reading Co., 300 Fed. 477 (E. D. Pa. 1924); Hickey V.
Johnson, 9 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); American Surety Co. of New
York v. Baldwin, 2 Fed. Supp. 679 (D. Idaho 1933).
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is entitled under the Constitution, the party pleading res judicate
may seek certiorari from the Supreme Court 4 4 and. thus secure a
federal determination of this "federal question."
Suits Involving Judicial Custody of Specific Property
It is in connection with suits where a court is dealing with, or
may be obliged to deal with, specific property-so-called suits iu r 'm
-that the federal courts have made most frequent use of the doc-
trine that, in order to protect their own jurisdiction, it is legitimate
to enjoin proceedings in state courts. Conflicts of jurisdiction over
specific property involved in actions in both a federal and a state
court occurred sporadically from a very early date. 5 The funda-
mental principle of comity between courts of concurrent jurisdiction
upon which these conflicts were settled was that the court which
first acquired jurisdiction over the property was entitled to retain
its jurisdiction free fr6m interference by other courts.-" But the
question of the applicability of Section 265 does not seem to have
arisen during the first one hundred years following the adoption
of the Constitution. In 1889, hoWever, in the case of Sharon v.
Terry,47 it was once more made apparent that the Act meant much
less than it seemed to on its face. Suit was brought in a federal
court to have an alleged marriage contract declared void as a for-
gery. The defendant thereafter successfully maintained an action
in a state court to have the same contract declared valid, and to
entitle her to share in the community property. The federal court
44. Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141 (1897); See
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. St. Joseph Union Depot Co., 92
Fed. 22, 26 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1S98). Apparently federal determination could
be immediately secured by removal of the controversy in the state court to
a federal court. Failure to give effect to a decree of a federal court was held
sufficient basis for removal in South Dakota Central Ry. Co. v. Continental
& Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 255 Fed. 941 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919);
Torquay Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 2 Fed. Supp. 841 (S. D. N. Y.
1932).
45. See Warren, supra note 12, at 347, 366.
46. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43 (1928). It was early held
that the state courts are without power to enjoin federal adjudications of
title to realty [McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279 (U. S. 1812)], and that
the state courts cannot interfere with actions of federal officers [UcClung V.
Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598 (U. S. 1821)], or with their control of property [Wallace
v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136 (U. S. 1839)], or custody of persons [Tarble's Case,
13 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1872)]. Similarly, federal courts were denied the power
to levy on property in the custody of state courts, [Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet.
400 (U. S. 1836)], or to discharge the liens established by prior state at-
tachments [Peck v. Jeness, 7 How. 612 (U. S. 1849)].
47. 36 Fed. 337 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1888), aff'd, 131 U. S. 40 (1889).
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subsequently found that the purported contract was a forgery and,
with the sanction of the Supreme Court, enjoined enforcement of
the state court's decree on the ground that federal jurisdiction over
the res had first attached. In 1903 this doctrine was extended by
the Supreme Court, in Julian v. Central Trust Co.,'18 to allow an
injunction to issue after the property which was the subject of the
federal suit had passed out of the possession of the federal court.40
Decisidns similar to those in the Sharon and Julian cases have
been rendered up to a very recent date. 0 But the scope of this
exception is limited by the doctrine of comity out of which it grew.
Thus it is only where the federal court has prior jurisdiction of a
suit in rem that an injunction will issue against a state suit con-
cerning the same property."' Some question has inevitably arisen
concerning the meaning of these phrases. A broad definition fre-
quently given of a suit in rem is that it is one dealing, either actually
or potentially, with specific property.5 2 But that suits in rem com-
48. 193 U. S. 93 (1903).
49. Accord: Fidelity Insurance Trust etc. Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co., 88 Fed. 815 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1898); Stewart v. Wisconsin Central By.
Co., 117 Fed. 782 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1902); Munroe v. Raphael, 53 Sup. Ct. 424
(1933).
50. Lang v. Choctaw, Oklahoma, & Gulf Rr. Co., 160 Fed. 355 (C. C. A.
8th, 1908); Swift v. Black Panther Oil & Gas Co., 244 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 8th,
1917); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123 (E. D. Mo.
1918); Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (a. C. A.
8th, 1922); Franz v. Franz, 15 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Fiske v.
State of Missouri, 62 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); of. Wabash Rr. Co.
v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38 (1907); Note (1908) 21 HAnV. L. REV. 433.
On the basis of the well-settled rule that a receiver may not be sued without
the consent of the court appointing him, it has been held that a federal court
may enjoin state suits against a receiver appointed by it. Oklahoma v. Texas,
265 U. S. 490 (1924). But under 24 STAT. 544 (1887), as amended by 25
STAT. 436 (1888), 28 U. S. C. § 125 (1926), a federal receiver, subject to the
general equity jurisdiction of the federal court, may be sued for any act of
his in carrying on administration of the property in his hands, regardless of
leave of the court appointing him. It is held that, under this statute, federal
courts cannot enjoin state suits against federal receivers. Willcox v. Jones,
177 Fed. 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); Smith v. Jones Lumber & Mercantile Co.,
200 Fed. 647 (W. D. Wis. 1912); American Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v.
Pere Marquette Rr. Co., 263 Fed. 237 (E. D. Mich. 1920), 278 Fed. 832 (E. D.
Mich. 1922).
51. Where the state court's jurisdiction of the property was prior to that of
the federal court, injunctions were denied. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v.
Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923); Insurance Finance Corp. v. Phoenix Securities
Corp., 42 F. (2d) 933 (D. C. Idaho, 1930); cf. Cochran v. W. F. Potts Son &
Co., 47 F. (2d) 1026 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
52. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Wabash Rr. Co., 119 Fed. 678 (C. C. A.
7th, 1902). Thus it is generally held that the following are suits in rcm:
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prise not only controversies where the court by the very nature of
the action -2st deal -with specific property,G3 but include also pro-
ceedings "where, in the progress of the litigation, the court mzay
be compelled to assume the possession and control of the property
to be affected," 54 is demonstrated by cases holding that suits in-
volving the legality of public utility rates are suits i& 7cm.c5 Simi-
larly, there has been dispute as to the meaning of prior jurisdiction.
Where both the federal and state suits are in renz., the court in which
proceedings were first instituted is regarded as having acquired
constructive possession of the property involved, and, consequently,
that its jurisdiction is prior to that of a court in which proceedings
are subsequently instituted, even though actual possession of the
property is first taken by the latfer court.50 But in cases where
bills to quiet title [Franz v. Franz, szpra note 50]; actions of ejectment
[Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294 (1884); cf. Hull v. Burr,
234 U. S. 712 (1914)]; to foreclose mortgages [Mercantile Trust & Deposit
Co. v. Roanoke & S. Ry. Co., 109 Fed. 3 (W. D. Va. 1901)]; to impress trusts
on property [Insurance Finance Corp. v. Phoenix Securities Corp., aupra note
51]; to have a receiver appointed [Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power Co.,
182 Fed. 279 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1910)]; to establish a right of user in the
flow of a stream [Rickey Land and Cattle Co. v. Miller and Lux, 218 U. S.
258 (1910)]. On the other hand, it is equally clear that suits on contracts for
damages are strictly in personam. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260
U. S. 226 (1922). A garnishment suit quasi in r m is not a suit in rcm within
the meaning of the exception under discussion. National Fire Insurance Co.
v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). Disagreement has arisen,
however, concerning the character of bills for the cancellation of contracts.
Compare Sharon v. Terry, supra note 47 (action to annul marriage contract
regarded as one in reem), with Great North Woods Club v. Raymond, 54 F.
(2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) (suit for cancellation of insurance policy held
not in rem).
53. It is to be noted that .a criminal defendant's person is a rcs, federal
jurisdiction over which may be protected by injunction against state inter-
ference. United States v. Brown, 281 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 8th 1922); see
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 260 (1922).
54. See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elevated Rr. Co., 177
U. S. 51, 61 (1900).
55. People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 192 Fed. 398 (C. C.
N. D. Ill. 1911); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Star Publishing Co.,
2 F. (2d) 151 (W. D. Wash. 1924); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Agnew, 5 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). For a clear exposition as to
why this, is true, see Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, 267 Fed.
231 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
56. Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118 (1909); see SInKmS, FEDEnAL PnLcrxCn
(1923) 752. Cf. Amusement Syndicate Co. v. El Paso Land Co., 251 Fed. 345
(W. D. Tex. 1918). But ef. Franzen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 278 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921) ; Weaver v. Field, 16 Fed. 22 (C. C. E. D.
La. 1883). Patterson v. Veasey, 295 Fed. 163 (N. D. Ga. 1924). A case
illustrating these last two rules is Havner v. Hegnes, 269 Fed. 537 (C. C. A.
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the courts are not of concurrent jurisdiction, or the subject matter
in litigation is not within the cognizance of one of the courts,61 it
is held that jurisdiction over property attaches to the court which
first takes actual possession of it.58
But even when the federal court has prior jurisdiction of specific
property, if the state action is not of such a nature that its inde-
pendent determination will hinder or impede the federal court in
its administration of the property, the state action may not be en-
joined. This notion is a logical development of the rule laid down
in Kline v. Burke Construction Co."9 that the mere pendency in
courts of concurrent jurisdiction of two suits in personam involving
the same parties and issues affords .no ground for the issuance of
an injunction by the court in which suit is first instituted. The
qualification of this holding developed in cases where specific pro-
8th, 1920). Here the plaintiff sued in the federal court for the appointment
of a receiver; before a receiver was appointed, a state court in a suit sub-
sequently instituted appointed a receiver who took actual possession of the
property. The federal court restrained further proceedings in the state court
and directed the state receiver to surrender the property.
57. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43 (1928); of. In ro Prunotto,
51 F. (2d) 602 (W. D. Va. 1931).
58. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256 (1894); Empire Trust Co. v. Brooks,
232 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916); of. Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 53 Sup. Ct.
605 (U. S. 1933). In the former case a state court in which proceedings for
the winding-up of a corporation had been first instituted, but which had no
jurisdiction to enforce the collection of maritime liens on vessels included in
the corporation's assets, was held not to have jurisdiction concurrent with
that of a federal court which had taken actual possession of the boats under
proceedings subsequent to those in the state courts.
Where jurisdiction is concurrent, a suit for the appointment of a receiver
subsequent to a suit in personam in another court vests the former court with
such jurisdiction over the property as to prevent levying execution thereon
under the suit in personam. Jackson v. Parkersburg & Ohio Electric Co., 233
Fed. 784 (N. D. W. Va. 1916). But if a suit in personam results in the at-
tachment of property before a suit for a receiver is instituted, the court
appointing the receiver gets no jurisdiction over the attached property. Gateg
v. Bucki, 53 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); Lydick v. Neville, 287 Fed. 479
(C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Ke-Sun Oil Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 21. But of,
Pacific Coast Pipe Co. v. Conrad City Water Co., 245 Fed. 846 (C. 0. A.
9th, 1917). Similarly, where a state suit in personam has resulted in judg-
ment, and the judgment lien has attached, a receiver subsequently appointed
in a federal court cannot enjoin enforcement of the lien. Bortman v.
Urban Motion Picture Industries, 4 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Baker v.
Ault, 78 Fed. 394 (C. C. D. Wash. 1897). But the result is contrary if the
judgment is not docketed, so that its lien has not attached when the proccedingg
for receivership are begun. Davis v. Seneca Falls Mfg. Co., 8 F. (2d) 540
(W. D. N. Y. 1925), modified in 17 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Quinn v.
Bancroft Jones Corp., 12 F. (2d) 958 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
59. Note 33, supra.
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perty is involved, should be limited to cases where practical con-
siderations indicate the advisability of a single determination of
all questions in dispute involving the property. A most important
decision indicating that an exception to Section 265 will only be
made in cases where such considerations are present, is the recent
Supreme Court case of Riehle v. Margolies,60 in which the Court
refused to enjoin continuance of a personal action in a state court
against a corporation for which the federal court had appointed an
equity receiver. The Court's decision was predicated upon the
ground that a state action in personam does not necessarily inter-
fere with a federal court's custody and administration of an estate
in receivership. It is uncertain whether or not the implications
of this decision will be permitted to extend its effect beyond the
precise holding, as the opinion laid some stress upon the circum-
stance that the state suit was pending when the federal receiver-
ship proceeding was instituted.6 ' In cases where the state suit was
commenced after the federal court had taken jurisdiction over the
property, an injunction has been denied in one instance"' but
granted in another.6 3
The decisions, however, of Judge Mlack in Stansbunry v: Koss "
and of Judge Learned Hand in In re Putnam,65 may both be re-
garded as extending the principle of the Riehle case to such situa-
tions, and as carrying out its implicit declaration that the principles
of the Kline case may be applied to federal suits in rem. In the
Stansbury case the defendants, executors of the will of the wealtby
Ella V. VonE. Wendel offered the will for probate in a New York
state court. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a bill in the federal
court alleging that she had been fraudulently induced to execute an
agreement not to contest the will and praying for its cancellation
and for an injunction against its use in connection with the probate
60. 279 U. S. 218 (1929). See also International & Great Northern Ry. Co.
v. Adkins, 14 F. (2d) 149 (S. D. Tex. 1926).
61. See 279 U. S. 218, 225 (1929).
62. Guardian .Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 171 Fed. 43
(C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
63. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Broadway and Seventh Avenue Rr. Co., 43 F.
(2d) 130 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
64. S. D. N. Y., Dec. 24, 1931.
65. 55 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). With the Stansbury and Pitnam
cases should be contrasted a recent decision in the Fourth Circuit, which holds
that the power of the federal courts to protect their jurisdiction by enjoining
state proceedings is not confined to suits in rcrn, but extends to any situation
where the jurisdiction of the federal court may be impaired. Brown v. Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 62 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933). The court's
treatment of the Kline case is wholly unsatisfactory.
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of the will. Judge Mack ruled that, although the prior probate
proceeding was in' rem, the federal court had jurisdiction. 0 This
decision is equally applicable to cases where a federal court with
prior jurisdiction of a res is requested to enjoin a subsequent state
action in personam. He said:
"Probate proceedings are in remn; moreover, in this country they are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts. But it is well settled
that actions or suits in personm, though affecting or establishing rights
against the estate, such as the claims of creditors or beneficiaries, and
thus incidental to the probate proceedings in which the judgments or
decrees may have to be filed in order to share in the estate, are within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, if there be the essential diversity
of citizenship. See Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 225-26 and cases
cited. Such a suit 'neither ousts the jurisdiction of the court in which
the first suit was brought, nor does it delay or obstruct the exercise of
the jurisdiction, nor lead to a conflict of authority where each court acts
in accordance with the law.' Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S.
226, 232 (1922) . .. "67
In the Putnam case, despite the settled construction of the Ship-
owners' Limited Liability Act of 1851 as giving federal courts, in
which proceedings to limit liability have been instituted, power to
enjoin the prosecution in state courts of claims against the owner
of the vessel,68 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
appears to have applied to federal proceedings for the limitation of
liability the principles of the Kline case. It held that, since the
limitation proceedings did not involve any res which the federal
court was called upon to administer, an injunction against state
actions on claims against the owner would not issue. The language
of Judge Learned Hand strongly manifests the increasing reluc-
tance to extend the scope of existing exceptions to Section 265. After
observing that the doctrine which supposedly controls the disposi-
tion of these cases is that of exclusive jurisdiction in the court first
securing control of the res, he declares:
"There are perhaps no greater practical difficulties in allowing two suits
in rem to proceed together than two suits in personam, and it is well
settled that the plea of lis alio pendens is not good between state and
federal courts. McClelland v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 .. .; Kline v. Burke
66. Cf. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamoille Valley Rr. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 9,
432 (C. C. D. Vt. 1879); Berrara v. City Real Estate Co., 64 F. (2d) 498 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1933). See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 720 (U. S. 1871); Russell
v. Detrick, supra note 19, at 177.
67. See note 64, supra.
68. See note 5, supra.
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Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226 .. .Therefore the doctrine must rest upon the
formal requisite that jurisdiction in suits in rem depends upon actual
possession of the res-or power at any time to assume it-and that a
scramble for possession would be an unedifying spectacle.
"The case at bar does not present that situation. The claimant's pro-
posed action is in personam; no interest in the yacht is at stake. Execu-
tion will run against the petitioner's assets generally . . .; indeed against
his person . . .; if his assets fail . . . The statute (U. S. C., tit. 46,
Sec. 183) . .. does not presuppose any pre-existing res of which the
court is to take possession ...When there is but a single possible claim,
a contrary result would only remove the cause from the tribunal properly
vested with jurisdiction; in short, avoid a jury trial. The statute intended
nothing of the sort, and the effort is to be discountenanced." 0
It is the language and attitude of the court in the Stansbury and
Putnam cases, rather than the actual holdings, which are significant.
They strongly suggest the incipient breakdown of the heretofore
crystallized rule of law that federal jurisdiction over specific prop-
erty necessarily draws to the court exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters affecting such property. The wisdom of this new approach
to the exception which has been created with respect to federal suits
in rem can hardly be doubted. The acknowledged policy of the
statute is to guard against the friction which invariably accom-
panies jurisdictional conflict: Even if other considerations of
policy, such as the desirability of a single determination of all ques-
tions involving administration of specific property, are taken to
justify a departure from the ban on the operation of injunctions
between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, still the rule allowing
these departures should be no broader than the policy to which it
purports to give effect. The Riehle, Stanzsbury, and Putnam cases
have made it apparent that judges do not find it invariably necessary
that all issues which may possibly affect specific property be de-
termined by a single court.
A related question of great importance is the effect which should
be given to adjudications in suits in personam in other courts, by
the court under whose jurisdiction the property is being adminis-
tered. The problem is of particular and timely interest in the case
of federal equity receiverships. For clearly, even though it be
held that a federal receivership does not in itself justify injunctions
against state suits in personam which do not threaten interference
with the course of administration, the state proceedings will, never-
theless, frequently be robbed of all utility if they are not held con-
clusive of the amount or validity of claims against the debtor
69. Supra, note 65, at 74-75.
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whose estate is in receivership. It has long been settled that a
judgment in personam is conclusive, in a receivership proceeding
of the amount and validity of the claim, both when rendered before
appointment of a receiver in another court 7o and when rendered
after such appointment, provided the receiver intervened or other-
wise took part in the suit.71 But the state courts have been in con-
flict with reference to the situation where the receiver is not in any
way a party to a judgment rendered after he was appointed.72 As
far as federal receiverships are concerned, Riehle v. Margolies 7
held the state judgment conclusive where the suit was begun before
the receivership.7 4 Whether a judgment in a state suit begun after
proceedings for a receivership had been instituted would likewise
be conclusive was expressly left undecided. 75 However, Judge Mack's
conclusion in the Stansbury case that the federal court had juris-
diction to determine the validity of the complainant's agreement not
to challenge probate of the will at least shows that such distinction
70. Hopkins v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 436 (1877); of. Stearns v. Lawrence, 83 Fed.
738 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897).
71. Bereth v. Sparks, 51 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); of. Smith v.
United States Express Co., 135 Ill. 279, 25 N. E. 525 (1890). While the courts
often talk the language of estoppel in these cases, it has been correctly pointed
out that the principles of res judicata are quite sufficient to support tho
conclusions. See Beach, Judgment Claims'in Receivership Proceedings (1921)
30 YALE L. J. 674, 674-76.
72. Massachusetts has held such judgments inconclusive, and that the re-
ceiver may properly hear and determine the claim do novo. Attorney-General
v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 196 Mass. 151, 81 N. 11. 960
(1907). The New York courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Pringlo
v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 502 (1882).
78. 279 U. S. 218, 228 (1929).
74. Accord: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh & Western Rr. Co., 29
Fed. 732 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1887); Pine Lake Iron Co. v. Lafayette Car Works,
53 Fed. 853 (C. C. D. Ind. 1893); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City
Ry. Co., 161 Fed. 786 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908). The converse should, of course,
be equally true; federal judgments in personam should be regarded as binding
adjudications of the amount and validity of claims in state receivership pro-
ceedings. See United States v. Illinois Surety Co., 238 Fed. 840, 846 (E. D. N. C.
1917). If the suit in personam has not been brought to judgment by the time
when distribution of the assets in the hands of the receiver is to be made,
probably distribution will not wait upon determination of the state suit, and
the receiver himself may adjudicate the claim. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v.
New York City Ry. Co., supra; see Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 224
(1929); of. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 229 Fed. 120 (C. C. A.
2d, 1915).
75. See Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 225 (1929). In Pringle v.
Woolworth, supra note 72, a judgment of a foreign court was held conclusive
although that action was instituted after the New York court had appointed
a receiver.
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need not necessarily be drawn. For, in that case, the federal suit
in personam was instituted after the petition for probate had been
filed in the state court, and on the well-established doctrine of con-
structive possession the state court had already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction of all matters directly affecting distribution of the de-
cedent's assets. If in such a situation the federal court may hear
related suits in personam, it would seem to follow that state courts
may with equal propriety determine suits in pcrsonam commenced
after the appointment of a federal receiver.7"
Void or Izequitable Jvdgments
Behind all the judge-made exceptions to the injunction statute
thus far discussed has been the notion that the injunction against
state proceedings is in the nature of an ancillary remedy granted
for the purpose of protecting the previously acquired jurisdiction
of a federal court. In 1891, however, in Marshall v. Holzes,
77 the
Supreme Court introduced into the statute an exception which bears
no relation to the protection of federal jurisdiction. In that case
it was held that a federal court might enjoin a litigant from enforce-
ing a judgment obtained in a state court by fraudulent means. The
decision was rested on the ground that the injunction would not
act upon the court itself but merely upon the person of the party
litigant by taking from him the benefit of a judgment obtained by
fraud. Obviously, the interference with state courts which Section
265 prohibits is no less substantial where the proceedings are stayed
by process issued against the litigants therein than where the court
itself is enjoined. Moreover, considered purely as a matter of
general chancery practice, apart from any considerations peculiar
to the relation between state and federal courts, it has long been
settled that an injunction against court proceedings should always
issue only against the plaintiff, never against the judge before whom
the cause is being tried.78 Even during the reign of James the
First, when the conflict between law and equity was most bitter,
the chancellors did not presume to exercise the injunctive power
against the judges themselves.7" It is hardly to be supposed, there-
fore, that the framers of the injunction statute were seeking only
76. But see Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479 (1893).
77. 141 U. S. 589 (1891).
78. Home National Bank of Cleburne v. Wilson, Judge, 265 S. W. 732
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); see (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 371.
79. Note, Common Pleas (1626), LrrroN, p. 37; see Lofft 38 (c. p. 1626)
Eng. Rep.; see WIrsoN, LiFE OF JAMiEs I. pp. 94-95; 2 CAznPBELL, Ln'.s OF THE
LORD CHANCELLORS (1846) 241 et seq.
1185FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE POWER1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to prevent federal injunctions against a state court as such. In-
deed, if there is substance in the distinction taken by the Court,
it is difficult to see why it should not justify an injunction even
against pending state proceedings, of whatever nature, whenever
sufficient equitable grounds are shown, provided the injunction is
so framed as to run only against the litigants. In spite of the fal-
lacy on which this distinction rests, however, it has frequently ieen
made in the lower federal courts: 80 injunctions sought against a
sheriff to prevent him from levying execution under a state courtjudgment have been denied,81 while injunctions against judgment
creditors, to prevent them from causing execution to be levied, have
been freely granted. 2
In 1914, in Simon v. Southern Railway,83 the Supreme Court
undertook to spell out at greater length the theory on which was
based the power of federal courts to enjoin the execution of statejudgments. In this case, the state judgment whose enforcement was
enjoined was not one which had been fraudulently obtained, but
one which was void for want of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. The Court declared that while Section 265 prohibits
enjoining pending proceedings, yet "when the litigation has ended,
and a judgment has been obtained, and the plaintiff tries to use
such judgment, a new state of facts not within the statute may
arise." 84 After using the dubious authority of Julian V. Central
Trust Co.85 for the proposition that. a federal court may enjoin the
inequitable use of a state judgment, the Court continued:
"If in a proper case a plaintiff holding a valid state judgment may be
enjoined by a federal court from its inequitable use, by so much more
can the federal court enjoin him from using that which purports to be
a judgment, but which is in fact an absolute nullity . . .That conclusion
is inevitable, or else the federal court must hold that a judgment-void
for want of service-is a 'proceeding in a state court' even after the pre-
tended litigation has ended and the void judgment has been obtained,
80. National Surety Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 Fed. 593 (C. C. A.
8th, 1903); Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Ore.
1907); Chicago, Rock "Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799(C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
But see Mercantile Trust Co. v. Binford, 6 F. (2d) 285, 287 (N. D. Tex. 1925);
Rosa Dew Stansbury v. Koss, supra note 64; Security Trust Co. v. Union
Trust Co., 134 Fed. 301, (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904).
81. Leathe v. Thomas, 97 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899).
82. See cases cited in note 80, supra.
83. 236 U. S. 115 (1914).
84. Id. at 124.
85. 193 U. S. 93 (1904).
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Such a ruling would involve a contradiction in terms, and treat as valid
for some purposes that which the courts have universally held to be a
nullity for all purposes." 86
It seems clear that the Court's decision is based upon a construc-
tion of the word "proceedings" in the statute. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the Court means that judicial business of which the
forum has no jurisdiction is not a "proceeding" within the statute,
or that nothing which niay transpire after judgment in any case is
such a "proceeding." There seems little reason to believe that the
word "proceeding" was used in the statute in any more limited
sense than to include any application to a state court for aid in the
enforcement of rights. But, however that may be, any quibble over
this point would now be unprofitable, for the rule that the enforce-
ment of a void judgment may be enjoined is well settled.6T This
exception to the statute cannot, however, be justified on the ground
that the injunctive power is pecessary to secure federal protection
to aggrieved litigants, for the question of the lack of personal juris-
diction is a federal question under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and not only may the state judgment be
directly reviewed by the Supreme Court, but it may, if in fact
rendered without due process, be questioned defensively as in
Pennoyer v. Neff.. s
Subsequent decisions have clarified the principles upon which the
Simon case may be said to rest. In Essanay Film Manufacturing
Co. v. Kane,;9 a federal court was asked to enjoin an action for
conversion which was being brought against the complainant in
a state court of New Jersey, again on the ground that the state
court was without personal jurisdiction. This time, however, the
state action had not yet gone to judgment. The Court seized upon
this fact as being a sufficient bar to the complainant's bill, and con-
tented itself with distinguishing the Simon case on the ground that
there the litigant was enjoined from "enforcing a final judgment." 09
86. 236 U. S. 115, 125, 128 (1914).
87. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924);
Seay v. Hawkins, 17 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). But cf. Fenwic: Hall
Co. v. Saybrook, 66 Fed. 389 (C. C. D. Conn. 1895); Union Pacific Rr. Co. v.
Flynn, 180 Fed. 565 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1910); Seaboard Airline Co. v. Fowler,
275 Fed. 239 (W. D. N. C. 1921). See (1923) 35 HAV. L. REv. 472. Of
course, enforcement of a state judgment will not be enjoined merely because the
state court erred in its application of the law. Wagner Electric Co. v. Lyndon,
282 Fed. 219 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). But cf. Danciger v. Stone, 187 Fed. 853
(C. C. E. D. Okla. 1909).
88. 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
89. 258 U. S. 358 (1922).
90. Id. at 360. (Italics supplied).
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But if a case in which the state court is without jurisdiction is not
in fact a "proceeding" within the meaning of the statute after judg-
ment, it may be questioned whether it is any the more a proceeding
before judgment. The judgment can be no more a nullity than is
that from which it sprang. Viewed in the light of the Essanayj case,
the Simon case must be taken to mean, not that the lack of juris-
diction deprives the state court's action of the character of a "pro-
ceeding," 91 but that the fact that judgment has been rendered does
so. 02 In other words, "proceedings," which alone the statute em-
braces, last only up to judgment; thereafter, the action taken by
the officers of a court in a case-such as the levying of execution
under the judgment by the sheriffs-must be called by some other
name.
93
The decision in the Simon case, as it appeared before the Esscnay
case, would clearly be no authority for the issuance of a federal
injunction against inequitable state judgments. For, although a
judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is a nullity, the
same is not true of one which is obtained by fraud or in breach of
91. It is no ground for a federal injunction against a pending state
proceeding that the state court is acting without jurisdiction. Detroit Monroe
& Toledo Shore Line Ry. Co. v. City of Monroe, 262 Fed. 177 (E. D. Mich.
1919).
92. In 1885, the Supreme Court had squarely refused to recognize any such
distinction by disallowing an injunction against the enforcement of a state
judgment. Sargent v. Helton, 115 U. S. 348 (1885).
It is impossible to find any basis of statutory interpretation for holding
that the statute does not apply to steps taken after judgment. Furthermore,
if it be true that the statute was to a large extent the result of the proposal
made by Edmund Randolph (see note 14, supra), the instant exception removes
from the operation of the statute the very cases which were foremost in
Randolph's mind as the ones in which state courts should be assured of freedom
from federal interference, since Randolph was primarily concerned with
preventing a separation of law and equity between the state and federal courts
after a case had proceeded to judgment in the state courts.
93. However, it has been frequently held that "proceedings" within Section
265 include all steps taken in a suit from its inception to and including final
process. Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles County, 276 Fed. 305 (S. D.
Cal. 1921); Mills v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 100 Fed. 344 (C. C. A. 9th,
1900); American Association v. Hurst, 59 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893); Daly
v. Sheriff, Fed. Cas. No. 3553 (C. C. D. La. 1871); Security Trust Co. v. Union
Trust Co., 134 Fed. 301 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Flynn,
supra note 87; of. Yick Wo v. Crowley, 26 Fed. 207 (C. C. D. Cal. 1880);
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825). But of. Rennsselaer & S. It.
Co. v. Bennington & Rutland Rr. Co., 18 Fed. 617 (C. C. D. Vt. 1883). The
decision to the contrary in Cropper v. Coburn, Fed. Cas. No. 3416 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1855), is said to have been overruled by Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450
(U. S. 1860).
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contract.94  Hence, if the Essanay case had not placed the Simon
case in a new light, it would be more difficult to understand the
court's citing the latter case, along with Marshall v. Holmes,05 as
authority for the decision in Wells Fargo & Co v. Taylor,"" decided
in 1920. There the defendant, an employee of the plaintiff express
company, had, in violation of a contract with the plaintiff to assume
all risk of injury incident to his employment, obtained a judgment
in a state court against a railway company, which the express com-
pany had contracted to indemnify in respect of claims for damages
by express company employees injured while travelling on the rail-
way. The Supreme Court upheld an injunction against enforcement
of the judgment, on the insubstantial ground that Section 265 was
a mere rule of comity which must yield where it "would materially
hamper the federal courts in the discharge of duties otherwise
plainly cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of Congress." 'T
The upshot of the matter is that wherever there exist these par-
ticular equitable grounds for enjoining proceedings in general, the
federal courts, after judgment has been rendered in the cause, will
act precisely as would any other court of equity, not hedged about
by the inhibitions of Section 265.0s  But is that all? The answer
given in the very recent case of Western Unzion Telegraph Co. v.
Tompa 99 is that it is not. The federal court, it was declared, need
not wait until the state judgment has been rendered to issue its
94. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290 (U. S. 1866).
95. 141 U. S. 589 (1891).
96. 254 U. S. 175 (1920).
97. Id. at 133.
98. The cases in which it has been held that enforcement of a state court's
judgment may be enjoined by a federal court wherever it can be shown that
such enforcement would be contrary to principles of equity are numerous.
Fetzer v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Mohawk Oil Co. v.
Layne, 270 Fed. 841 (W. D. La. 1921); Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,
268 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Union Ry. Co. v. Illinois Central Rr. Co.,
207 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Linton v. Safe Deposit Co., 147 Fed. 824
(W. D. Pa. 1906); see Riverside Oil & Refining Co. v. Dudley, 33 F. (2d) 749,
752 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). The fact that the sheriff is about to levy execution
on the plaintiff's property under a judgment rendered against another person
is held to be no ground for enjoining the levy. Republic Power & Service Co.
v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 9 F. (2d) 476 (W. D. La. 1925); Mill v.
Provident Life & Trust Co., American Ass'n v. Hurst, Daly v. Sheriff, all
supra note 93.
99. 51 F. (2d) 1032 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). The facts of this case are
substantially identical with those of the Wells Fargo case. See note 96, mtpra.
The language of the court is significant: ["Section 265] does not extend to
the issuance of an injunction against the enforcement of a judgment obtained
in a state action where the prosecution of the state suit would be enjoined
but for [Section 265]." Id. at 1034.
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injunction, but may forthwith enjoin the defendant from doing
anything to enforce any judgment he may obtain in the pending
state action and leave him otherwise to proceed as he may be ad-
vised. At least there is nothing insidious in this disposition of the
case; it gives the defendant due warning and bids him proceed, if
he dares, with advance knowledge of the futility of so doing. But
certain it is that the language of the case, if followed, completely
emasculates the statute, for it allows an injunction the intended and
inevitable effect of which is to stop the state proceeding, in any
case in which a plaintiff can show grounds upon which any other
court of equity, not subject to Section 265, would grant an injunc-
tion.
The Federal Injunction as a Device for Testing the
Constitutionality of State Statutes
It has been pointed out that the peg upon which the Supreme
Court hung its decision that federal courts might enjoin the enforce-
ment of void or inequitable state judgments was a definition of
"proceedings" which excluded activity subsequent to judgment. A
further exception to the statute had, even earlier, been worked out
through the use of this same device. When state statutes embody-
ing exercise of the police power, particularly statutes or orders of
commissions fixing public utility rates, precipitated a flood of
federal questions under the Fourteenth Amendment, various con-
siderations led the utilities to prefer that the litigation take place
in the federal courts. 100 This gave rise .to a common practice of
testing the validity of allegedly unconstitutional statutes by a bill
in the federal courts praying for an injunction, issuing against state
officers, to enjoin the prosecution of civil or criminal actions seeking
to enforce the statutes. 01
To this practice the objection was made that injunctions against
the enforcement of state statutes were forbidden by Section 265.
Some support for this contention, in cases where injunctions were
sought against criminal proceedings, was found in the decision in
Harkrader v. Wadley,102 to the effect that a federal court which had
taken charge of the assets of a corporation could not enjoin a
criminal prosecution of an officer of the corporation for embezzle-
100. Cf. Lockwood, Maw, Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunotion
in Constitutional Litigation (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rv. 426, 450-452, 454.
101. Cf. Warren, supra note 12, at 373-74; Lilienthal, The Federal Courts
and State Regulation of Public Utilities (1930) 43 HAItv. L. REV. 379, 380;
Lockwood, Maw, Rosenberry, supra note 100, at 426.
102. 172 U. S. 148 (1898). See also Milwaukee, St. Paul & S. S. M. Ry.
v. Milner, 57 Fed. 276 (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1893).
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ment. But the Harkrader case did not prove a substantial obstacle,
for the contention that the injunctive method of testing constitu-
tionality violated Section 265 was overthrown in Ex parte Young 103
where it was decided that threatened action in the state courts by
state officers was not a "proceeding" within the meaning of the
statute. On the other hand, it was expressly declared in a dictum
that, if the proceedings had already been instituted in the state
court, Section 265 would apply, and the injunction could not issue.'"
The distinction thus established has been consistently followed in
the lower federal courts. °0 1 If this distinction were the sole deter-
mining factor, it would seem to follow that whenever the state offi-
cials actually bring suit to enforce the statute, their action would
then assume the character of a "proceeding" and the issuance of an
injunction become no longer proper. But this has not proved to
be unqualifiedly true, for the concept of "protecting the jurisdiction
of the federal courts" has been made the basis for enjoining actual
state court proceedings to enforce a state statute, where such a suit
is instituted subsequent to the filing of a bill in the federal court
to determine constitutionality by means of a prayer to enjoin state
administrative or legislative activity or threatened prosecutions. 10
The practice of testing the validity of state legislation by federal
equity procedure has given rise to some friction between the federal
government and the states.10 7 It has certainly encountered the dis-
approval of commentators. 0 s But here, as in the case of suits in-
103. 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
104. See id. at 161.
105. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Kuteman, 54 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892);
Glucose Refining Co. v. City of Chicago, 138 Fed. 209 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1905);
Western Rr. Co. v. Rr. Commission of Alabama, 11 Fed. 694 (C. C. N. D.
Ala. 1909); Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500 (W. D. Mo.
1912); Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, 198 Fed. 532 (W. D. Mo. 1912); see
St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Allen, 181 Fed. 710 (W. D. Ark. 1910); Fenner v.
Boykin, 3 F. (2d) 674 (N. D. Ga. 1925), aff'd, 271 U. S. 240 (1926); cf. Prout
v. Starr, 110 Fed. 3 (C. C. D. N. C. 1901), aff'd, 188 U. S. 537 (1903); Camden
Interstate Ry. Co. v. City of Catlettsburg, 129 Fed. 421 (E. D. Ky. 1904);
Danciger v. Stone, 187 Fed. 853 (E. D. Okla. 1909).
106. Looney v. Eastern Texas Rr. Co., 247 U. S. 214 (1918). But cf. Grubb
v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U. S. 470 (1930).
107. See Warren, supra note 12, at 374-376; Lilienthal, supra note 101, at
381. At a convention of the Attorney-Generals of the several states in 1907
a resolution was adopted recommending that Congress pass a law prohibiting
federal courts from restraining state officers and administrative boards from
instituting proceedings to enforce state laws or orders of legislative com-
missions. See 65 CnNT. L. J. 304 (1907).
108. It has been suggested that the improvement of state procedure would
largely obviate the necessity for federal interference in this category of cases.
See Frankfurter, The Federal Courts (1929) 58 NEW REPUBLIC 273, 275.
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volving jurisdiction over specific property, signs of a change of
viewpoint are not lacking. The authority of the federal courts to
enjoin the non-judicial proceedings of state tribunals was subjected
to limitations of comity in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,OD
where the Supreme Court declared that a federal court must wait
until the state has spoken its final legislative word before issuing
an injunction. And recently, in Interborough Rapid Transit Co.
v. Gilchrist,"° the Court definitely indicated that the doctrine of
comity which prompted the decision in the Prentis case is of suffi-
cient importance to justify further restrictions of discretion on
the issuance of injunctions against state officers and commissions. 1
The Interborough decision makes it clear that the Prentis doctrine
will be adhered to even where it is in fact perfectly plain that the
administrative or legislative action taken will be unfavorable to the
claims of the complainant.112
Federal Injunctions Sought by the United States Government
The most recent exception made to the injunction statute, and
one which has not yet received the sanction of the Supreme Court,115
was announced in the case of United States v. Inaba.114 In sub-
stance, the scope of this exception is that where the United States
government as plaintiff is seeking a federal injunction against state
judicial proceedings, for the protection of its own rights or prop-
erty, Section 265 is no bar to the injunction. The Court, in granting
the injunction in the Inaba case, reasoned that, inasmuch as the
United States cannot be sued without its consent, to deny it any
relief in the federal court would be to force it by indirection to
subject itself to the jurisdiction of the state court for the protection
109. 211 U. S. 210 (1908); see Note (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 349.
110. 279 U. S. 159 (1929).
111. It should be noted in connection with both the Prentis case and the
original bill in the Interborough case, that the precise holdings are that non-
judicial proceedings will not be enjoined until the final legislative action is
taken; the cases taken together, however, seem to indicate that injunctions
against threatened judicial proceedings are subject to the same limitation,
112. See the comments upon the significance of the Interborough case in
Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1928 (1929) 43 HARv. L. R v. 33, 61-62. And compare Hawks v. Hamill, 288
U. S. 52 (1933), in which the Supreme Court has very recently held that,
where jurisdiction is predicated solely upon diversity of citizenship and the
questions involved are purely local, the federal courts will not grant an in-
junction against action on the part of state officers unless the case is abso-
lutely clear.
113. But cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 222 (1882).
114. 291 Fed. 416 (E. D. Wash. 1923); see (1923) 37 HARv. L. Rnv. 387.
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of its rights. Moreover, said the Court, the United States could not
even voluntarily intervene in the state action without congressional
authority, since the United States District Attorney has no power
to appear for the United States in such a way as to submit it to the
jurisdiction of a state court; consequently, if the injunction were
not granted, the government in such circumstances would have
fewer rights than a private litigant would have. It has been sug-
gested, however, that although the United States cannot be made
a defendant in a state court without congressional authority, which
has never been given, it can be, and frequently has been, made a
plaintiff in such an action."n If this be true, the major premise
of the court's argument fails, since it would only have been neces-
sary for the United States to enter the suit as party plaintiff.
There was admittedly no precedent for the decision in the Inaba
case. On the contrary, the Supreme Court had previously held in
United States v. Parklhursto-Davis Co.,'" in which the United States
sought to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting state actions
against certain Indian allottees, that Section 265 forbade the in-
junction. This decision was distinguished on the ground that in the
former case the Indians on whose behalf the government was suing
held patent allotments of land in fee, and, since they were sui juris,
they could defend on their own behalf in the state action, whereas
in the Inaba case the government held title to the land in trust for
an Indian ward, and was acting to defend its own property. This
reasoning has been affirmed in decisions in subsequent cases where
the government is seeking to protect its title to property,1 17 or to
remove obstructions to the operation of federal instrumentalities.11 8
The theoretical basis of this exception has, therefore, come to be
that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits to
which the United States is a party in interest, and that Section 265
is no bar to injunctions in aid of that jurisdiction. This rationale,
like those supporting other exceptions, involves a departure from
the clear import of the terms of the statute. It might, therefore,
have been preferable to base the exception in cases where the
United States is a party, upon the common law rule that general
115. See (1923) 72 U. PA. L. Ray. 192 and cases cited.
116. 176 U. S. 317 (1900).
117. United States v. McIntosh, 57 F. (2d) 573 (E. D. Va. 1932).
118. United States v. Babcock, 6 F. (2d) 160 (D. Ind. 1925), modified in
9 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925). The District Court based its conclusion
on the fact that the United States was suing to protect its own interests, and
therefore Section 265 was not applicable. In modifying the decree below, the
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the proceedings sought to be enjoined were
not judicial in character, citing Public Service Commission v. Corboy, 250 U. S.
153 (1919).
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words in a statute do not include the sovereign unless the sovereign
is expressly mentioned.19
Conclusion
The cases which have been examined are a startling revelation
of the fate of a statute which does not command the respect of the
courts. Although sweeping and unqualified in its terms, it does
not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but only their equity
powers; it does not bind them prior to the institution of state suits,
nor after judgment therein; if deemed necessary to make effective
their own jurisdiction, it is ignored altogether. Whichever of the
various historical explanations of the statute is embraced, it seems
a safe assertion that the cases in which injunctions against state
proceedings were sought to be prevented are the very ones in which
the statute has been refused operation. 20 To say that the statute
merely enacts a doctrine of comity which already existed, and that
the limitations on that doctrine may therefore be enforced though
not in terms included in the enactment, is little more than a circum-
locution announcing that the statute will be departed from when-
ever, in the judgment of the court, necessity or convenience invites
the departure. To assert that prevention of the unseemly conflict
between courts which the statute was designed to obviate neces-
sitates deviation from its letter in order to observe its spirit is
rationalization of no higher order.
But several of the limitations which the courts have placed upon
the statute are now so crystallized that discussion of their intrinsic
merit is purely academic. It is in connection with judicial admin-
istration of insolvents' and decedents' estates, and in the field of
corporate reorganization, that expansion or contraction of the scope
of the statute is most likely to present a practical problem. The
enormous growth in the administrative activity of courts must give
rise with increasing frequency to situations where, although the
pendency of a state action does not deprive the federal court ofjurisdiction (or vice-versa), special circumstances make it advis-
able that a race for judgment between the litigants in each of the
courts should be averted. In several instances such a situation has
been taken care of through a voluntary stay of proceedings by the
119. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore. 261,
269, 217 Pac. 332, 335 (1923).
120. Section 265 is not the only statute limiting federal injunctive powers
which has been judicially flouted. Similar treatment has been accorded the
statute which declares that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the as-
sessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." 26 U. S. C.§ 154 (1926); cf. Miller v. Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498 (1932).
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court in which suit was last commenced, pending determination of
the issues in the suit previously instituted.12  One such situation
occurred in Langnes v. Green.,2 2 where it was held that, although
the federal court had jurisdiction to entertain a shipowner's suit
for limitation of liability despite the pendency of a prior action in
a state court, the fact that the case involved but one possible claim-
ant and but one owner required that the federal court should, as
a matter of discretion, stay proceedings pending the outcome of the
state suit. In re Putnam 1-3 went a step farther by staying pro-
ceedings in the federal court in favor of actions not yet pending in
the state court, but which might be brought within a reasonable
time. Similarly, in the Stansbury case,2 4 Judge Black ruled that,
while the complainant had a statutory right of recourse to the
federal courts, since the constitutional requisites of jurisdiction
existed, it was nevertheless within the discretion of the federal
court to stay proceedings there pending the outcome of the state
suit. And the fact that the federal suit for cancellation of the con-
sent to probate was vitally related to the probate proceedings 25
over which the state court had exclusive jurisdiction, he found to
be such a circumstance as justified the federal court in declining
to exercise immediately its admitted jurisdiction.
What special circumstances must exist in order that the federal
court shall be entitled to grant a stay of proceedings cannot be cate-
gorically stated. The Supreme Court has made it plain that this
discretionary power by no means exists in all cases of concurrentjurisdiction. In McClelland v. Carlazd 2 the plaintiffs sued in a
121. Zimmerman v. So Relle, 80 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Bunker Hill
Mining Co. v. Shoshone Mining Co., 109 Fed. 504 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901); In reLasserot, 240 Fed. 325 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); cf. Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed.
17 (C. C. D. Vt. 18S0); Keystone Dairy Co. v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
19 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
122. 282 U. S. 531 (1931).
123. Note 65, supra.
124. Note 64, supra.
125. The federal courts have shown particular reluctance to interfere with
state proceedings involving probate matters. Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S.254 (1875); Freeney v. First National Bank, 16 Fed. 433 (C. C. D. Neb. 1882);
Evans v. Gorman, 115 Fed. 399 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1902); Smith v. Jennings,
238 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915); King v. Fernley, 283 Fed. 451 (S. D. Fla.
1922); Tussing v. Central Trust Co., 34 F. (2d) 312 (E. D. Mich. 1929); cf.
Wickham v. Hull, 60 Fed. 326 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1894). A recent rather e.treme
case in the opposite direction is Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Franz, 51 F.(2d) 1047 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). Cf. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (U. S.1874) (holding that a federal judgment may establish a right to share in adecedent's estate being administered by a state court); Byers v. MeAuley,
149 U. S. 608, 620 (1892).
126. 217 U. S. 268 (1910).
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federal court to establish rights in a decedent's estate. On motion
of the Attorney-General of South Dakota the federal court entered
an order staying proceedings until the state could bring an action
in its own courts to determine its rights in the estate by way of
escheat. The Supreme Court held that it was the duty of the federal
court to hear the plaintiff's case, and granted mandamus to vacate
the stay order. This case was followed in Great North Woods Club
v. Raymond,127 which was decided only a few weeks before the
Stansbury case and which held that the pendency in a state court
of a suit to cancel an insurance policy gave a federal court in which
the beneficiary subsequently brought an action on the policy no
discretion to stay proceedings in favor of the state suit. The court
stated that it is usually true that, where the federal court has juris-
diction of the parties and the subject matter, the plaintiff has an
absolute right to have his case proceed to trial.128
The very nature of the problem is such that to lay down a rigid
rule governing the right of a federal court to decline to exercise
jurisdiction in deference to a state court is neither practicable nor
desirable.129 Necessarily, much must be left to depend upon whether
or not the facts of a particular case present a situation in which
to take jurisdiction would be to interrupt the harmonious concurrent
activity of federal and state tribunals which the principles of comity
are designed to promote, or would be to run counter to the policy
of non-interference which the successful maintenance of a dual sys-
tem of courts requires.
It will not do to assume that we have passed beyond the days
when conflicts between states and nation may impair the smooth
functioning of the federal system. Adjustment is still necessary
to insure harmony. The vast areas of judicial business which federal
and state courts continue to share still provoke situations in which
one or the other must yield if the action of either is to be effective.
Unrestrained interference with the one by the other cannot obvi-
ate or mitigate sources of friction, and continuous disregard of a
127. Note 52, supra.
128. Accord: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamoille Valley Rr. Co., Fed. Cas.
No. 9,432 (C. C. D. Vt. 1879).
129. Cf. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876); Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99
U. S. 168 (1878); Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Morris, 132 Fed. 945 (C. C. A.
8th, 1904); City of Ironton v. Harrison Construction Co., 212 Fed. 853 (C. C. A.
6th, 1914); Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co., 141 Fed. 282 (C. C. A.
5th, 1905); City of Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed. 329
(C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Defiance Water Co. v. City of Defiance, 100 Fed. 178
(C. C. N. D. Ohio 1900); Fradella v. United Marine Contracting Corp., 80
F. (2d) 510 (E. D. N. Y. 1928); see Green v. Underwood, 86 Fed. 427, 429
(C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
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restraint imposed upon interference cannot contribute to the solu-
tion. These considerations, and the revived attitude of respect for
the statute and its underlying principles which clearly appears in
recent decisions of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts,
strongly suggest the possibility and desirability of the revitalization
of Section 265. Other decisions lend weight to a belief that in the
future delicate problems of conflicting jurisdiction will be solved
in the federal courts more often by a stay of their own proceedings
than by the manufacture of ingenious devices for evading the
statute. Such an approach seems to offer the most promising solu-
tion of the ramified problems arising out of judicial administration
of estates and insolvent enterprises in a nation whose political
structure is still in great measure decentralized. Real and critical
these problems must continue to be as long as that decentralization
persists.
